Based on the Reliability Option: A New Mechanism Design Method for Power Generation Capacity Adequacy

DOI

10.2991/978-94-6463-459-4_125How to use a DOI?

Keywords

reliability option; power generation capacity adequacy; auction clearing

Abstract

With the deepening of power market reform, the issue of power generation capacity adequacy has become increasingly prominent. To address this issue, this paper proposes a new mechanism design method for power generation capacity adequacy based on reliability options. Through steps such as parameter determination, entity bidding, auction clearing, contract signing, and price difference settlement, this method aims to optimize the allocation of the power market. Additionally, this paper discusses the constraints in the auction clearing process of reliability options and verifies the effectiveness of this method through case analysis.

Copyright

© 2024 The Author(s)

Open Access

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Zhang Jian
AU  - Liu Miao
AU  - Zhang Kai
AU  - Wang Zongyuan
AU  - Feng Zhanwen
AU  - Dong Bo
PY  - 2024
DA  - 2024/07/23
TI  - Based on the Reliability Option: A New Mechanism Design Method for Power Generation Capacity Adequacy
BT  - Proceedings of the 2024 9th International Conference on Social Sciences and Economic Development (ICSSED 2024)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 1123
EP  - 1132
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-459-4_125
DO  - 10.2991/978-94-6463-459-4_125
ID  - Jian2024
ER  -