Research on the Problem of Official Rent-seeking in Public Service Outsourcing in China

DOI

10.2991/isemss-19.2019.101How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Public service outsourcing, Official rent-seeking, Countermeasures

Abstract

As an efficient public service provision, public service outsourcing has gradually been adopted by countries all over the world. However, in the development of public service outsourcing in China, there is a corruption problem in which officials use their power for rent-seeking. This not only wastes social resources, but also reduces the quality of public service supply and harms the rights and interests of the public, which is not conducive to the long-term stability of the country. The key to solving the problem of rent-seeking by officials in public service outsourcing is to analyze the causes of the officials themselves, the symmetry of outsourcing information, the cost of rent-seeking and the supervision mechanism, and propose corresponding solutions to promote the healthy development of public service outsourcing and guarantee the quality and efficiency of public service supply.

Copyright

© 2019, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Zhu Xiaoning
AU  - Chen Wei
PY  - 2019/09
DA  - 2019/09
TI  - Research on the Problem of Official Rent-seeking in Public Service Outsourcing in China
BT  - Proceedings of the 2019 3rd International Seminar on Education, Management and Social Sciences (ISEMSS 2019)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 524
EP  - 528
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/isemss-19.2019.101
DO  - 10.2991/isemss-19.2019.101
ID  - Xiaoning2019/09
ER  -