Green Supplier Selection With Government Subsidy

DOI

10.2991/aebmr.k.201211.095How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Supply chain, supplier selection, government subsidies, game theory

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of government subsidy on the retailer’s supplier selection in a green supply chain. We develop a game model where the supply chain consists of a green manufacturer, a non-green manufacturer and a common retailer. The retailer should determine its sourcing strategy: only selling non-green products (N), only selling green products (G), or selling both products (D). Both the retailer and the green manufacturer consider environmental impact as well as profit maximization. We identify thresholds of social responsibility for the retailer to make sourcing strategy without government subsidy. The results show that the retailer would not select green supplier when it has a relatively low social responsibility. Further, we explore the effect of government support, namely sales subsidies, on the retailer’s supplier selection. We show that government subsidies always stimulate the market demand for green products. When the retailer has low or moderate social responsibility, government subsidy could induce the retailer to shift its sourcing strategy from N to D, or from D to G. However, when the retailer’ social responsibility is high enough, it would always choose to sell green products(G) even without government subsidy. Numerical examples are included to illustrate the major results.

Copyright

© 2020, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

Download article (PDF)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Qingling Yu
AU  - Fei Sun
AU  - Hui Yang
PY  - 2020
DA  - 2020/12/14
TI  - Green Supplier Selection With Government Subsidy
BT  - Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Economic and Business Management (FEBM 2020)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 557
EP  - 562
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.201211.095
DO  - 10.2991/aebmr.k.201211.095
ID  - Yu2020
ER  -