A Study of Three-Party Evolutionary Game in the Context of Carbon Disclosure

DOI

10.2991/978-94-6463-447-1_28How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Carbon information disclosure; Rent-seeking behavior; Evolutionary game; Construction enterprises

Abstract

Given mandatory carbon info disclosure in construction and potential rent-seeking between enterprises and third-party agencies, this paper explores local gov’t strategic choices using an evolutionary game model. MATLAB simulations analyze evolutionary paths and parameter sensitivities to establish a system without government review. Results suggest fines can enhance disclosure quality, but reducing disclosure costs and boosting third-party agencies’ benefits are crucial. This study offers insights for improving carbon info disclosure quality.

Copyright

© 2024 The Author(s)

Open Access

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Yongkun Wang
AU  - Wanze Li
AU  - Peng Wang
PY  - 2024
DA  - 2024/07/14
TI  - A Study of Three-Party Evolutionary Game in the Context of Carbon Disclosure
BT  - Proceedings of the 2024 3rd International Conference on Engineering Management and Information Science (EMIS 2024)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 247
EP  - 257
SN  - 2352-538X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-447-1_28
DO  - 10.2991/978-94-6463-447-1_28
ID  - Wang2024
ER  -