Dynamic Penalty Evolutionary Game and Computer Simulation of Cooperative Promotion in Supply Chain

DOI

10.2991/978-94-6463-102-9_109How to use a DOI?

Keywords

supply chain cooperation; retailer promotion; evolutionary game

Abstract

“Management dilemma” is frequent in supply chain cooperation promotion. By constructing an evolutionary game model with the manufacturer and the retailer as the game players, the above-mentioned problem is dynamically analyzed, and the evolution path is simulated by MATLAB. The results show that no stable strategy is adopted in the evolutionary system and cooperative promotion is in a circular state when the manufacturer adopts static punishment. When the manufacturer adopts the dynamic penalty regulation policy, the evolutionary system stabilizes with the mixed strategy. At the same time, the manufacturer’s stronger punishment can improve the retailer’s choice probability of promotion strategy, but the promotion subsidy cannot improve the cooperative promotion.

Copyright

© 2023 The Author(s)

Open Access

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

Download article (PDF)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Yongjie Tian
PY  - 2022
DA  - 2022/12/29
TI  - Dynamic Penalty Evolutionary Game and Computer Simulation of Cooperative Promotion in Supply Chain
BT  - Proceedings of the 2022 2nd International Conference on Business Administration and Data Science (BADS 2022)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 1046
EP  - 1056
SN  - 2589-4900
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-102-9_109
DO  - 10.2991/978-94-6463-102-9_109
ID  - Tian2022
ER  -