Beyond Neuroscience Cognitivism: Criticism of Substance and Structural Dualisms
- DOI
- 10.2991/assehr.k.200205.001How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- Cartesian dualism, structural dualism, person, mereology, cognitive reductionism
- Abstract
The Cartesian dualism of body and soul no longer finds resonance in the means of scientific research. Recent discovery in the brain functioning have rekindled the debate. Neuroscientists and philosophers propose to overcome the puzzle that represents the person, in the midst of a culture in which it is not allowed to omit or subject the body to any higher entity. However, it is only baseless belief that neurons respond by the appearance of the mental phenomenon. Abdicating the dualism of substance does not overcome this mystery. What is present is the continuation of typical polarization to dualisms. The classical model is replaced by the structural dualism of brain and mind, perpetuating a kind of Crypto-Cartesianism. The myself human becomes understood as being of a biological nature, following a deterministic pattern. In this reduction to a part, the dimension of the whole is lost. Brains do not think, feel and decide, only people. In this mereology, the requirement of logical reasoning is abducted. Cognitivists turn people into machines. But people always transcend and, shortening their meaning, does not guarantee that it preserves its importance while being ethically responsible. Person is unveiling and permanent covering-up. The Cartesian shadows need to be left behind by the indivisible personal entity. Soul people don’t have, they are living soul. They are beings born in the flesh. The fact is that a new person image is not in progress, in spite of all possible and necessary corrections. Freedom is intelligence, so that the frontiers of what is possible to know must be respected, so that there is no confusion.
- Copyright
- © 2020, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Joni Fischer Gerson PY - 2020 DA - 2020/02/13 TI - Beyond Neuroscience Cognitivism: Criticism of Substance and Structural Dualisms BT - Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Social Science, Public Health and Education (SSPHE 2019) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 1 EP - 4 SN - 2352-5398 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.200205.001 DO - 10.2991/assehr.k.200205.001 ID - Gerson2020 ER -