Quality Signaling by Location in Market for Search Goods

DOI

10.2991/ssemse-15.2015.435How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Location game; signaling theory; search cost

Abstract

This paper discusses the quality signaling in the location game considering search cost. We comment on Paul W.J. de Bijl’s paper published in the International Journal of Industrial Organization and point out that the proof of equilibria in the original article was not complete. We also question the search cost being considered as a variable cost in the original article, and suggest that it is more reasonable to consider it as a fixed cost. The detailed proof is give in the paper and future research ideas are provided.

Copyright

© 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - J. Wu
PY  - 2015/11
DA  - 2015/11
TI  - Quality Signaling by Location in Market for Search Goods
BT  - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Social Science, Education Management and Sports Education
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 1701
EP  - 1705
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/ssemse-15.2015.435
DO  - 10.2991/ssemse-15.2015.435
ID  - Wu2015/11
ER  -