The Management to Strengthen the Coal Mine Safety in China Based on Cooperative Game Theory

DOI

10.2991/saeme-17.2017.25How to use a DOI?

Keywords

safety economics, cooperative game, coal enterprise, security interest.

Abstract

According to the current situation of China's coal mine production safety management such as lack of sense of responsibility, lack of safe input and other phenomena. With the help of cooperative game model, this article establishs game model of coal Supervision Bureau as the representative of the government departments, the coal mining enterprises, and miners. By this modle drawing a conclusion to solve the distribution of security interests that all three parties could accept. Based on the cooperative game model, the paper puts forward some measures to strengthen the safety management of coal industry in China. The government plays a regulatory function. The enterprises actively increase the safety input, at the same time, the enterprises give employees the rights of the safety production supervision. And employees strengthen the awareness of legal rights and conscious operation. Through the three parties cooperation to increase safety investment, it is conducive to reducing security incidents, as well as the steady development of coal industry safety management.

Copyright

© 2017, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Xiaojie Zhai
PY  - 2017/07
DA  - 2017/07
TI  - The Management to Strengthen the Coal Mine Safety in China Based on Cooperative Game Theory
BT  - Proceedings of the 2017 International Conference on Sports, Arts, Education and Management Engineering (SAEME 2017)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 119
EP  - 123
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/saeme-17.2017.25
DO  - 10.2991/saeme-17.2017.25
ID  - Zhai2017/07
ER  -