Revenue-sharing Contract of Supply Chain with Sale Effort Cost Partaking

DOI

10.2991/lemcs-15.2015.240How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Supply chain coordination; Revenue-sharing contract; Effort effect; Cost partaking

Abstract

As an effective method to coordinate supply chain, revenue-sharing contract cannot function when the demand is uncertain and dependent on the retailer’s sale effort. Considering a supply chain with one single supplier serving one retailer, the aforementioned result is explained through the theoretical analysis. To coordinate the supply chain, a new revenue sharing contract with sale effort cost partaking was therefore proposed, and the supply chain coordination can be achieved. The new contract is apt to implement because of few contract parameters. Finally, a numerical example was given to illustrate the model and obtain the optimal allocation proportion of revenue. The proposed model demonstrated that both supplier and retailer can gain more profits when the new contract is applied.

Copyright

© 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Zhiyong Liu
PY  - 2015/07
DA  - 2015/07
TI  - Revenue-sharing Contract of Supply Chain with Sale Effort Cost Partaking
BT  - Proceedings of the International Conference on Logistics, Engineering, Management and Computer Science
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 1203
EP  - 1206
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/lemcs-15.2015.240
DO  - 10.2991/lemcs-15.2015.240
ID  - Liu2015/07
ER  -