Analyses on the Equilibrium Model of Financing Game—Based on Block Chain Technology

DOI

10.2991/assehr.k.200331.055How to use a DOI?

Keywords

financing, game theory, block chain

Abstract

China’s small and micro enterprises have made and are making indispensable contributions to promote the development of the national economy, increase employment and maintain social stability. However, the traditional financing channel is single, the financing cost is high, and the financing difficulties greatly restrict many enterprises to further develop and grow. Under the background of rapid development of financial science and technology represented by block chain, big data, cloud computing, artificial intelligence and so on, financial models are constantly being innovated, and Internet financing models are increasingly becoming an important and effective way to raise funds for small and micro enterprises in the future. Using dynamic game theory tools, this paper makes model analysis on financing modes based on block chain technology, and draws a conclusion that financing modes that improve information asymmetry based on block chain can better alleviate the financing difficulties of small and micro enterprises. Finally, it points out the risks existing in the application of block chain technology in the credit field at present, and puts forward some suggestions, hoping to promote the healthy development of financial science and technology industry including Internet financing industry.

Copyright

© 2020, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Qingyuan feng
PY  - 2020
DA  - 2020/04/02
TI  - Analyses on the Equilibrium Model of Financing Game—Based on Block Chain Technology
BT  - Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Social Sciences and Economic Development (ICSSED 2020)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 260
EP  - 263
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.200331.055
DO  - 10.2991/assehr.k.200331.055
ID  - feng2020
ER  -