The Influence of CEO Compensation on Disclosure of Related Party Transactions with Corporate Governance as a Moderate Variable
- DOI
- 10.2991/aebmr.k.211225.020How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- Executive director compensation; disclosure of related party transaction; corporate governance; CEO duality
- Abstract
This study analyzes the effect of executive director (CEO) compensation on disclosure of related party transactions moderated by corporate governance. The samples used in this study were non-financial companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2017-2019. This study employed the purposive sampling method. The total data observations in this study were 1116 data from non-financial companies. The analytical tools utilized in this study were multiple linear regression analysis and the subgroup method for the moderating variable. The results of this study revealed that executive director compensation had a positive effect on disclosure of related party transactions, CEO duality had a positive effect on disclosure of related party transactions, and CEO duality moderated the positive effect of executive director compensation on disclosure of related party transactions.
- Copyright
- © 2022 The Authors. Published by Atlantis Press International B.V.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Ratna Dewi Anggraini AU - Evy Rahman Utami PY - 2022 DA - 2022/01/13 TI - The Influence of CEO Compensation on Disclosure of Related Party Transactions with Corporate Governance as a Moderate Variable BT - Proceedings of the International Conference on Sustainable Innovation Track Accounting and Management Sciences (ICOSIAMS 2021) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 141 EP - 149 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.211225.020 DO - 10.2991/aebmr.k.211225.020 ID - Anggraini2022 ER -