Do Collective Operating Construction Land (COCL) Transactions Inhibit Land Fiscal Revenue? Evidence from Deqing County, China
- DOI
- 10.2991/aebmr.k.220209.063How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- COCL transaction; Land fiscal revenue; land price; agglomeration effect
- Abstract
China’s local governments monopoly land market, and the land revenues account for a large proportion of the local government fiscal revenues. In 2015, collectively-owned operating construction land (COCL) entering the market was piloted across China, which is an institutional reform that provides rural collectives with transfer rights of COCL. Taking Huzhou City as an example, this paper first discusses the COCL transaction and its disintegration of government monopoly in land supply. Using the panel data of 3644 pieces of industrial land transactions from 2010 to 2019, we investigated and examined the impact of COCL reform on government land fiscal revenue with Spatial difference-in-difference (SDID) method. The results show that: (1) The policy of COCL entering the market has a significant effect on county-level government industrial land fiscal revenue. (2) As the COCL is scattered and its mortgage rights remain constrained, COCL fails to compete with state-owned industrial land and COCL transactions have no significant impact on the total leasing-area of state-owned industrial land. (3) While COCL entering the market contributing to industrial agglomeration, significantly increase the price of state-owned industrial land. This study provides an evidence that COCL reform fails to restrain the local government’s land fiscal revenue, and contributes to industrial development in rural China. Policy implications are drawn from this analysis, for the further reform of China’s rural land marketization.
- Copyright
- © 2022 The Authors. Published by Atlantis Press International B.V.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Man Jiao AU - Hengzhou Xu PY - 2022 DA - 2022/03/01 TI - Do Collective Operating Construction Land (COCL) Transactions Inhibit Land Fiscal Revenue? Evidence from Deqing County, China BT - Proceedings of the International Conference on Public Organization (ICONPO 2021) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 493 EP - 504 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.220209.063 DO - 10.2991/aebmr.k.220209.063 ID - Jiao2022 ER -