Pricing, Carbon Footprint and Signaling Game

DOI

10.2991/iccte-17.2017.89How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Carbon Footprint, Pricing, Signaling Game, Equilibrium

Abstract

Taking carbon footprint as the signal of production quantity, it creates the signaling game model of pricing between firm and consumer. By graphic analysis tools, such as indifference curve, it researches deeply the equilibriums of the model, such separating, pooling and hybrid equilibriums. The results show that there exists the only equilibrium in the case of low tech firm(LTF) does not envy high tech firm(HTF). while LTF envying HTF, there exist separating, pooling and hybrid equilibriums. But pooling and hybrid equilibriums are not robust. They cannot be realized without the aid of external forces, such as regulations and administrative powers. The separating equilibrium is self enforced, and the emission reduction at the separating point is larger than that in the case of no envy. So it is advantageous to emission reduction. The research is meaningful for firm's decision on carbon footprint and pricing especially in the market scenario that carbon label can be used as the signal of product quantity.

Copyright

© 2017, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Zhiyong Tian
AU  - Ruiping Yuan
AU  - Lingyu Huo
PY  - 2017/07
DA  - 2017/07
TI  - Pricing, Carbon Footprint and Signaling Game
BT  - Proceedings of the 2017 2nd International Conference on Civil, Transportation and Environmental Engineering (ICCTE 2017)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 505
EP  - 512
SN  - 2352-5401
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/iccte-17.2017.89
DO  - 10.2991/iccte-17.2017.89
ID  - Tian2017/07
ER  -