Methodology of Neo-inductivism: Critical Analysis

DOI

10.2991/iccessh-19.2019.2How to use a DOI?

Keywords

induction; scientific law; inductive proof; inductive confirmation; probability; logical probability

Abstract

The main principles of the methodology of neo-inductivism are analyzed — the core of the philosophy of science of logical positivism. The main difference between neo-inductivism and Bacon-Mill classical inductivism is the new understanding of the main function of induction as a cognition method. In classical inductivism, the function of induction consisted in the discovery of scientific laws and the subsequent proof of their truth based on facts. In the methodology of neo-inductivism the fundamental impossibility of solving such problems was recognized, since the discovery of hypotheses of scientific laws based on experience is not a logical, but a creative process, and, secondly, since the truth of scientific laws cannot result from the truth of their corollaries. The only positive logical role of induction in scientific cognition consists only in confirmation of scientific laws and theories by experience. Therefore, although the construction of the inductive logic of discovery and proof of scientific laws is impossible in principle, but the solution of a weaker, but real task is quite possible: the construction of an inductive logic of confirmation of scientific hypotheses.

Copyright

© 2019, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Sergey Lebedev
PY  - 2019/07
DA  - 2019/07
TI  - Methodology of Neo-inductivism: Critical Analysis
BT  - Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Contemporary Education, Social Sciences and Humanities (ICCESSH 2019)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 5
EP  - 9
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/iccessh-19.2019.2
DO  - 10.2991/iccessh-19.2019.2
ID  - Lebedev2019/07
ER  -