A Game Theory Analysis on Local Governments’ Competition for New Energy Industries

DOI

10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.9How to use a DOI?

Keywords

governments; new energy industries; performance assessment mechanism; game theory; chicken game

Abstract

This paper analyzes the ongoing game scenario of local governments’ efforts in developing new energy industries under a tournament-type performance appraisal system and draws two conclusions on the basis of chicken game and first-price sealed auction. The two conclusions are: (1) local governments’ competition efforts present a likelihood of excess capacity in the new energy sector instead of the intended overall promotion of the industries, thus reducing the local profits and harming the long-term sector-wide benefits; (2) the competing game between new-energy investors and local governments assumes a high degree of possibility of landing local governments in a prisoners’ dilemma, thus alluring local governments to adopt any preferential policy options in fear of losing the game.

Copyright

© 2013, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Xiaoming Qiu
AU  - Ying Wang
PY  - 2013/10
DA  - 2013/10
TI  - A Game Theory Analysis on Local Governments’ Competition for New Energy Industries
BT  - Proceedings of the 2013 International Academic Workshop on Social Science
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 37
EP  - 41
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.9
DO  - 10.2991/iaw-sc.2013.9
ID  - Qiu2013/10
ER  -