Competition, Disclosure and Optimal Information Resource Allocation

DOI

10.2991/aebmr.k.201211.026How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Competition, disclosure, central planner, information resource, optimal allocation

Abstract

This paper proposes a unified framework to explain that why firms compete in a product market differ from each other in resource endowments about information. It is proved that the difference may be resulted from a state-contingent optimal information resource allocation scheme carried out by a central planner. Information possessed by the planner will be assigned to only one of the firms when level of competition is above the threshold, and will be assigned to all firms when the level is below the threshold. A new determinant factor is employed to bridge the gap in existing literature.

Copyright

© 2020, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Hao Peng
AU  - Qiuping Guo
AU  - Zixiang Xia
PY  - 2020
DA  - 2020/12/14
TI  - Competition, Disclosure and Optimal Information Resource Allocation
BT  - Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on Economic and Business Management (FEBM 2020)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 140
EP  - 145
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.201211.026
DO  - 10.2991/aebmr.k.201211.026
ID  - Peng2020
ER  -