Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Supervision of Bad Loans in Commercial Banks

DOI

10.2991/emim-18.2018.131How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Commercial bank; Non-performing loans; Eevolutionary game

Abstract

The economic man's rational behavior and information asymmetry and other reasons, often lead to the commercial bank has hidden the impulse of non-performing loans, resulting in inconsistent accounts of the situation, affecting the economic operation. In this game the situation of information asymmetry, evolutionary game based on the idea of the establishment of commercial banks and regulators in two groups of non dynamic replication system symmetry evolutionary game, evolutionary stable state analysis system under different circumstances. It is concluded that under the condition of different parameter values, the system will tend to be in a different state of equilibrium.

Copyright

© 2018, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Jinliang Hua
PY  - 2018/08
DA  - 2018/08
TI  - Evolutionary Game Analysis on the Supervision of Bad Loans in Commercial Banks
BT  - Proceedings of the 8th International Conference on Education, Management, Information and Management Society (EMIM 2018)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 654
EP  - 658
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/emim-18.2018.131
DO  - 10.2991/emim-18.2018.131
ID  - Hua2018/08
ER  -