A Potential Application of Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Model in the Babysitter-Households Matching in China

DOI

10.2991/assehr.k.220109.011How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Deferred-acceptance algorithm; babysitter matching; Care Industry; market design; two-sided matching

Abstract

The traditional Gale-Shapley two-sided matching has been applied to high admission system in the US, which helps reduce the inefficiency when matching students and schools. In other areas like kidney exchange market, market design also plays an important role. Facing the upcoming third child policy in China, the author tries to apply the insights from market design to help better match the surging demand and supply of babysitters in China. This paper uses the ideas from Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Model to suggest an online matching system which focuses on the matching mechanism between households and babysitters. Then characteristics of the matching system are discussed to test if it is an ideal system. Significance of such system on both individual level and the greater economy are then examined. The limitations of the model and potential solution are brought up at the end before the final conclusion about this online matching system is drawn.

Copyright

© 2022 The Authors. Published by Atlantis Press SARL.

Open Access

This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license.

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Luyin Wang
PY  - 2022
DA  - 2022/01/24
TI  - A Potential Application of Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Model in the Babysitter-Households Matching in China
BT  - Proceedings of the 2021 International Conference on Culture, Design and Social Development (CDSD 2021)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 53
EP  - 56
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.220109.011
DO  - 10.2991/assehr.k.220109.011
ID  - Wang2022
ER  -