Giving the Authority to Subordinates: Does Budget Participation Really Affect Budgetary Slack in Public Sector?
- DOI
- 10.2991/aebmr.k.211124.045How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- Budget Authority; Budget Participation; Budgetary Slack; Public Sector Accounting
- Abstract
Although budget participation is acknowledged as a budgeting system that allows subordinates and superiors to create a more realistic budget and hinder budgetary slack, it is still unclear what mechanism in this process plays the role. This study focuses on the fairness perception of subordinates concerning the right to voice and vote in the budgeting process. This study aims at investigating the effect of budget authority on budgetary slack in the public sector. Data were collected by conducting an experimental study with 98 final-years undergraduate accounting students of a large public university in Bali. Using the One-Way ANOVA test as a data analysis technique, the type of budget authority does affect the creation of budgetary slack. The condition of superior budget authority (voice but no vote) encourages slacker than when the subordinate holds the authority (voice and vote). The results have some implications for organizational management policies.
- Copyright
- © 2021 The Authors. Published by Atlantis Press International B.V.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Made Aristia Prayudi AU - Nyoman Suadnyana Pasek AU - I Gede Agus Pertama Yudantara PY - 2021 DA - 2021/11/25 TI - Giving the Authority to Subordinates: Does Budget Participation Really Affect Budgetary Slack in Public Sector? BT - Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Tourism, Economics, Accounting, Management, and Social Science (TEAMS 2021) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 318 EP - 321 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.211124.045 DO - 10.2991/aebmr.k.211124.045 ID - Prayudi2021 ER -