Game Analysis of Industry Chain Cluster Reconfiguration Mechanism
- DOI
- 10.2991/assehr.k.211215.058How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- COVID-19 epidemic; Industrial chain; Industrial cluster
- Abstract
Based on the behavioral choice conditions of enterprises and governments in the transferring and taking over places of industries to achieve industry chain cluster reconfiguration in two economic environments of freedom and intervention, this paper contrasts and analyzes the dynamic mechanisms to complete industry chain cluster reconfiguration. The study finds that: the conditions for the enterprises in the transferring place and the enterprises in the receiving place to choose to participate in the industry chain cluster reconstruction strategy depend on the chance of the other party choosing to participate in the strategy; the governments in the transferring place and the governments in the receiving place may fall into the “prisoner’s dilemma” when they make a limited number of industry chain reconstruction transactions; the governments in the transferring place and the governments in the receiving place should be rewarded and punished in a certain way to make both parties choose to participate in the industry chain cluster reconstruction strategy. The incentive measures to make both parties choose the cooperation strategy consistently will lead to the cluster reconstruction of the industrial chain and maximize the interests of both parties.
- Copyright
- © 2021 The Authors. Published by Atlantis Press SARL.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Huiting Hua AU - Lingle Wang PY - 2021 DA - 2021/12/15 TI - Game Analysis of Industry Chain Cluster Reconfiguration Mechanism BT - Proceedings of the 7th Annual International Conference on Social Science and Contemporary Humanity Development (SSCHD 2021) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 315 EP - 319 SN - 2352-5398 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.211215.058 DO - 10.2991/assehr.k.211215.058 ID - Hua2021 ER -