Research on Policy Implementation of Government Purchasing Environmental Public Services
Based on the Analysis of Tripartite Cooperation and Confrontation Strategy
- DOI
- 10.2991/978-94-6463-200-2_81How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- Environmental Public Service; Government Procurement; Policy Implementation; Game Theory; Multiple Subjects
- Abstract
The current supply mode of environmental public services is dominated by government purchases. However, in the process of the government purchasing environmental public services, there are still many competing interests. Therefore, this paper focuses on policy implementation, comprehensively uses game theory and marginal theory, and discusses the interest game and coordination relationship among the three parties involved in the supply process of environmental public services, including the government, enterprises and the public. The study found that in the process of policy implementation, governments are more likely to reach a cooperative equilibrium with enterprises, forming a stable “rent-seeking” state, resulting in the loss of public welfare.
- Copyright
- © 2023 The Author(s)
- Open Access
- Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Shiyu Liu AU - Weilin Luo AU - Xiaotian Li AU - Yafei Li PY - 2023 DA - 2023/07/26 TI - Research on Policy Implementation of Government Purchasing Environmental Public Services BT - Proceedings of the 2023 3rd International Conference on Public Management and Intelligent Society (PMIS 2023) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 786 EP - 794 SN - 2589-4919 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-200-2_81 DO - 10.2991/978-94-6463-200-2_81 ID - Liu2023 ER -