Analysis on the Conduct of Managing Agent of State-owned Enterprises Based on Dual Reputation

DOI

10.2991/msmi-15.2015.20How to use a DOI?

Keywords

State-owned enterprise, Agency by agreement, Dual reputation, The behavior of management.

Abstract

The state-owned enterprise managers have a great feature, the operator is appointed by the superior government, the operators’ attention the relationship with administrative organization, the managers of state-owned enterprise have a strong consideration of reputation. The operator’s retention and promotion depends on the operator’s market reputation and political reputation. In the dual reputation, the operator behavior is divided into the normal behavior and the behavior of rent-seeking efforts, the operators maximize their expected utility through choosing their conduct. We analysis which factors influence the managers’ behavior, and study how to stimulate normal effort, reduce the rent-seeking behavior.

Copyright

© 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

Download article (PDF)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Feng Kong
AU  - Lin-Fang He
PY  - 2015/08
DA  - 2015/08
TI  - Analysis on the Conduct of Managing Agent of State-owned Enterprises Based on Dual Reputation
BT  - Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Management Science and Management Innovation
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 107
EP  - 111
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/msmi-15.2015.20
DO  - 10.2991/msmi-15.2015.20
ID  - Kong2015/08
ER  -