Evolutionary Game between Local Government and Enterprises under Penalty Mechanism of Carbon Emission Reduction

DOI

10.2991/978-94-6463-042-8_187How to use a DOI?

Keywords

evolutionary game; analogue simulation; carbon emission reduction

Abstract

As the main source of carbon emissions, enterprises are a crucial factor in carbon emission reduction. The paper based on the evolutionary game model of carbon emission reduction between local governments and enterprises under the penalty mechanism, analysis the evolutionary stability strategy of local governments and enterprises under different scenarios, and MATLAB simulation is used to analyze the impact of government supervision costs, enterprise emission reduction costs and government penalties on the evolution path. The results of the study show that when the fines imposed by local governments on enterprises are smaller than the cost of government supervision, the government chooses "no supervision" and enterprises choose to "dishonestly" carbon emission reduction; when the fine imposed by local governments on enterprises is greater than the government supervision costs, but the emission reduction cost of enterprises is greater than the sum of fines and credit losses, and enterprise choose to be "honesty" carbon emission reduction cost is too large, the government chooses "regulation" and companies choose "dishonesty".

Copyright

© 2023 The Author(s)

Open Access

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Xilian Wang
AU  - Xinyang Fan
PY  - 2022
DA  - 2022/12/29
TI  - Evolutionary Game between Local Government and Enterprises under Penalty Mechanism of Carbon Emission Reduction
BT  - Proceedings of the 2022 International Conference on mathematical statistics and economic analysis (MSEA 2022)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 1301
EP  - 1306
SN  - 2352-538X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-042-8_187
DO  - 10.2991/978-94-6463-042-8_187
ID  - Wang2022
ER  -