M&A, Institutional Investor and Executive Compensation

DOI

10.2991/msam-18.2018.72How to use a DOI?

Keywords

M&A; executive compensation; institutional investor

Abstract

The article try to explore the impact of M&A on executive compensation and further study the influence of institutional investors on the relationships between M&A and executive compensation. The study finds that the change in executive compensation has a significant positive correlation with M&A behavior, which reflects the fact that executives may tend to have self-interest in the event while the involvement of institutional investors will alleviate this problem. This study provides empirical evidence for institutional investor activism theory and the direction for corporate governance in M&A.

Copyright

© 2018, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Qiwen Hu
AU  - Yongsheng Ge
PY  - 2018/07
DA  - 2018/07
TI  - M&A, Institutional Investor and Executive Compensation
BT  - Proceedings of the 2018 3rd International Conference on Modelling, Simulation and Applied Mathematics (MSAM 2018)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 343
EP  - 346
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/msam-18.2018.72
DO  - 10.2991/msam-18.2018.72
ID  - Hu2018/07
ER  -