Product Market Competition, Ownership Differences, and Earnings Management: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

DOI

10.2991/lemcs-15.2015.287How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Competition; Ownership differences; State-owned; Non-state-owned; Earnings management

Abstract

This research uses data of Chinese listed companies during 2009-2012 to test the effects of product market competition on the incentives to engage in earnings manipulation in companies with different ownership type. Results show that competitive market has no impact on earnings management in state-owned companies, while non-state-owned companies in more competitive markets have less incentive to engage in earnings manipulation. Results also show that all kinds of companies with higher status in product market tend to incur higher level of earnings management. Moreover, for non-state-owned companies, concentrated ownership structure weakens the effect of product market competition but strengthen the effect of market status on earnings management.

Copyright

© 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Lihui Yu
AU  - Yanhua Wen
PY  - 2015/07
DA  - 2015/07
TI  - Product Market Competition, Ownership Differences, and Earnings Management: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies
BT  - Proceedings of the International Conference on Logistics, Engineering, Management and Computer Science
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 1444
EP  - 1449
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/lemcs-15.2015.287
DO  - 10.2991/lemcs-15.2015.287
ID  - Yu2015/07
ER  -