Scenario Analysis of Enterprise Annuity Supervision in China

DOI

10.2991/lemcs-14.2014.234How to use a DOI?

Keywords

enterprise annuity fund;supervision;scenario analysis; game theory;benefit distribution

Abstract

This paper studied the supervision of the enterprise annuity in China by the method of scenario analysis. Since supervision is closely related to the benefit distribution among the main participants of enterprise annuity, we present a game model to optimize the benefit distribution firstly. By calculating the model, we get the equilibrium solution of the game and find out the best probability of rent-seeking behavior. Then, we introduce a new method, scenario analysis to do the further research. Combining the game model and the method, we choose two factors, the penalty coefficient f1 and f2, as example to simulate scene. According to the scene simulated, we find that, as shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, increasing the penalty coefficient f1 and f2 can ease the rent-seeking behavior. However, as the penalty coefficient f1 and f2 become larger, increasing them is no longer an effective way to prevent rent-seeking behavior.

Copyright

© 2014, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Xuezhou Zhang
AU  - Kai Qiao
AU  - Peiwu Dong
PY  - 2014/05
DA  - 2014/05
TI  - Scenario Analysis of Enterprise Annuity Supervision in China
BT  - Proceedings of the International Conference on Logistics, Engineering, Management and Computer Science
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 1048
EP  - 1052
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/lemcs-14.2014.234
DO  - 10.2991/lemcs-14.2014.234
ID  - Zhang2014/05
ER  -