Evolutionary Game Analysis of Water Resources Conflict for Cascade Hydropower Stations in Multiple Power Generation Subjects

DOI

10.2991/lemcs-14.2014.214How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Evolutionary Game Analysis; Optimization; Cascade Hydropower; Water Resources; Conflict

Abstract

Against the incomplete information in the basin hydropower cascade system and bounded rationality of the behaviors of market subjects and through the analysis of competition and cooperation between the different interest groups of the river basin cascade hydropower stations, the dynamics model of evolutionary game is used to study the "tragedy of the commons" and compensation mechanism concerning the conflicts of different owners of the cascade hydropower stations for the realization of Pareto optimal equilibrium conditions under incomplete information and bounded rationality, so as to provide the decision-making support to optimized operation of the hydropower cascade system under market environment.

Copyright

© 2014, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Ye Mei
AU  - Bo Yang
AU  - Junjie Yang
AU  - Tao Wu
PY  - 2014/05
DA  - 2014/05
TI  - Evolutionary Game Analysis of Water Resources Conflict for Cascade Hydropower Stations in Multiple Power Generation Subjects
BT  - Proceedings of the International Conference on Logistics, Engineering, Management and Computer Science
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 949
EP  - 953
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/lemcs-14.2014.214
DO  - 10.2991/lemcs-14.2014.214
ID  - Mei2014/05
ER  -