Difficulty of cooperation in iterated multi-Prisoner's Dilemma situation-Experimental evidence-

DOI

10.2991/jcis.2006.322How to use a DOI?

Keywords

multi-contact, experimental economics, channel reduction, cooperation induction

Abstract

Using the laboratory experiment and simple multi–Prisoner’s dilemma model, this paper explores the effect of the change in the number of contacts and in the contact (payoff) structure, and then the characteristics of the strategy that leads players to reach mutual cooperation. When the number of contacts increases from one to two, players face with the more complicated situation and their behavior may be different from the single contact. The change of payoff structure will also affect their behavior. In fact, most of the subjects under multi contact who reached mutual cooperation adopted the "channel reduction and cooperation induction" strategy and dealt with the complicated situation. This strategy is similar to the GRIT strategy used for the resolution of the diplomatic problems.

Copyright

© 2006, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Kazuhito Ogawa
AU  - Tetsuya Kawamura
AU  - Tatsuya Kikutani
AU  - Sobei H. Oda
PY  - 2006/10
DA  - 2006/10
TI  - Difficulty of cooperation in iterated multi-Prisoner's Dilemma situation-Experimental evidence-
BT  - Proceedings of the 9th Joint International Conference on Information Sciences (JCIS-06)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/jcis.2006.322
DO  - 10.2991/jcis.2006.322
ID  - Ogawa2006/10
ER  -