CEO Turnover after Acquisitions: Are Self-interested Bidders Fired?

DOI

10.2991/isss-17.2017.86How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Mergers and acquisitions, CEO compensation, Agency problems, Corporate governance, CEO turnover.

Abstract

We examine the relation between the abnormal compensation acquirer chief executive officer (CEO) obtained and the probability of CEO turnover. Using a sample of 306 acquisitions made by Chinese listed firms during 2006 to 2010, we document a significant positive relation between the abnormal compensation changes and the likelihood of CEO turnover. Though CEO can extract substantial pecuniary benefits from acquisitions, large increases in abnormal compensation is a negative revelation of CEO preference, CEOs who make self-interested acquisitions are significantly more likely to be replaced within 5 years of the M&A completion.

Copyright

© 2017, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Xiang Ma
AU  - Weidong Xu
PY  - 2017/05
DA  - 2017/05
TI  - CEO Turnover after Acquisitions: Are Self-interested Bidders Fired?
BT  - Proceedings of 3rd International Symposium on Social Science (ISSS 2017)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 384
EP  - 390
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/isss-17.2017.86
DO  - 10.2991/isss-17.2017.86
ID  - Ma2017/05
ER  -