Incentive Mechanism Design Based on Repeated Game Theory in Security Information Sharing

DOI

10.2991/icssr-13.2013.90How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Security Information; Repeated Game; Incentive Mechanism; Sharing

Abstract

In addition to the security investment, security information sharing among firms has been proved to be an effective measure. In order to enhance the level of information security and improve the social welfare, this paper studies how to promote sharing through a certain reasonable incentive mechanism. We adopt the repeated game theory to establish incentive mechanism and analyze how similarity, isolation period, discount factor, proportion of rational firms and so on effect the efficiency of this incentive mechanism. We finally conclude the conditions required by the effective mechanism.

Copyright

© 2013, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Qiang Xiong
AU  - Xiaoyan Chen
PY  - 2013/07
DA  - 2013/07
TI  - Incentive Mechanism Design Based on Repeated Game Theory in Security Information Sharing
BT  - Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Science and Social Research (ICSSR 2013)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 394
EP  - 396
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/icssr-13.2013.90
DO  - 10.2991/icssr-13.2013.90
ID  - Xiong2013/07
ER  -