Research on Incentive and Restraint Mechanisms for the Construction of Local Government Affordable Housing

DOI

10.2991/icsshe-17.2017.62How to use a DOI?

Keywords

affordable housing, local government, incentive and restraint

Abstract

In China, execution of the construction of affordable housing is mainly relied on the actively cooperation by local governments. Local government plays a key role in the financing process of affordable housing. How to actively pursue the construction of affordable housing and the successful complete the task under the situation that the revenue of local government is decreasing and the fiscal spending is increasing, is the problem which needs to be solved by the central government. In this paper, for solving this problem, we use game theory to build the model and design the mechanism, to provide policy recommendations for the central government. Problems faced by the central government are to determine a feasible incentive mechanism, and makes its expected revenue Eu1 to be maximized. Central government confirms the reward system (r, h)and (`r, `h)based on local government' judgment rate to mobilize enthusiasm and initiative of local government on construct affordable housing.

Copyright

© 2017, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Xue Tan
PY  - 2017/09
DA  - 2017/09
TI  - Research on Incentive and Restraint Mechanisms for the Construction of Local Government Affordable Housing
BT  - Proceedings of the 2017 3rd International Conference on Social Science and Higher Education
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 248
EP  - 250
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/icsshe-17.2017.62
DO  - 10.2991/icsshe-17.2017.62
ID  - Tan2017/09
ER  -