Is Executive Risk-Taking a Bridge Between Compensation Incentive and Innovation Intensity?

DOI

10.2991/assehr.k.210407.054How to use a DOI?

Keywords

compensation incentive, innovation intensity, risk-taking level, ownership concentration

Abstract

Scholars at home and abroad pay attention to the influence of executive incentive on Enterprise R & D innovation, most of them discuss the relationship between the two, ignoring the path of action. This paper studies the relationship between executive compensation incentive and enterprise innovation intensity, establishes the path of “compensation incentive—risk-taking level—innovation intensity” from the perspective of executive risk-taking, and tests the moderating effect of ownership concentration on the relationship between them. The results show that compensation incentive promotes the innovation intensity of enterprises; the risk-taking level of executives has a mediating effect in the relationship between the two; ownership concentration negatively regulates the relationship between compensation incentive and innovation intensity. The results are helpful for enterprises to formulate reasonable incentive mechanism and improve the efficiency of corporate governance.

Copyright

© 2021, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Sun Xiaolin
AU  - Wang Sixue
PY  - 2021
DA  - 2021/04/08
TI  - Is Executive Risk-Taking a Bridge Between Compensation Incentive and Innovation Intensity?
BT  - Proceedings of the 2021 6th International Conference on Social Sciences and Economic Development (ICSSED 2021)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 264
EP  - 271
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.210407.054
DO  - 10.2991/assehr.k.210407.054
ID  - Xiaolin2021
ER  -