The Hierarchical Discrepancy in Chinese Government Behaviors and the Weakness in Policy Execution

DOI

10.2991/icpm.2012.7How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Central Government, Local Governments, Hierarchical Discrepancy, Incentive Incompatibility, Policy Execution.

Abstract

This paper puts forward a hypothesis suggesting a hierarchical discrepancy between Chinese central government and the local governments, which argues that, in the progress of policy making and implementation, the central government is an encompassing group, whose policy making stems from the historical responsibilities it carries, while the local governments, though politically obedient to the central government, and competing in economy with each other, usually take local economic growth into account during policy execution. By developing a double-task principal-agent model between central government and local governments, this paper comes to a conclusion that the incentive incompatibility, in the discipline contract between central government and local governments, is likely the root cause of the weakness in policy execution.

Copyright

© 2012, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Hu Wuxian
AU  - Hu Hui
PY  - 2012/08
DA  - 2012/08
TI  - The Hierarchical Discrepancy in Chinese Government Behaviors and the Weakness in Policy Execution
BT  - Proceedings of the 2012 International Conference on Public Management (ICPM 2012)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 163
EP  - 168
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/icpm.2012.7
DO  - 10.2991/icpm.2012.7
ID  - Wuxian2012/08
ER  -