Analysis of the Evolution of Construction-Designer Cooperation Behavior Based on Incentive Mechanism Under the IPD Model
- DOI
- 10.2991/978-94-6463-256-9_46How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- IPD model; Evolutionary game; Incentive mechanism; Cooperation
- Abstract
Based on the IPD model and the premise of the distribution incentive mechanism [1] given by the owner to the construction and design parties, this paper analyzes the evolutionary game between the construction and design parties, so as to find out the positive strategy to maximize the benefits of cooperation and the balance state of cooperation between the two parties. The results show that: Under this mechanism, the slow input of the initial energy of both parties and the preference of the owner for the designer’s reward in the cooperation between the two parties have a promoting effect on the overall positive collaboration. Meanwhile, the constructor tends to save costs while the designer tends to create benefits. In the case of losses for both parties, the constructor has a stronger risk-bearing capacity and plays an important role in maintaining the positive stability of the designer.
- Copyright
- © 2024 The Author(s)
- Open Access
- Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Chaolun Wu AU - Guanghua Li PY - 2023 DA - 2023/10/09 TI - Analysis of the Evolution of Construction-Designer Cooperation Behavior Based on Incentive Mechanism Under the IPD Model BT - Proceedings of the 2023 4th International Conference on Management Science and Engineering Management (ICMSEM 2023) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 451 EP - 460 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-256-9_46 DO - 10.2991/978-94-6463-256-9_46 ID - Wu2023 ER -