Attacker-Defender Signaling Game in Multi-Period Based on Technology Accumulation and Bayesian Learning

DOI

10.2991/icmmita-15.2015.282How to use a DOI?

Keywords

technology accumulation; signaling game; Bayesian learning; multi-period.

Abstract

The paper models an incorporated multi-period dynamic signaling game between one attacker and one defender with incomplete information. It is assumed that the defender of two types for high and low attribute properties pays attention to his innovation and development by accumulating technologies, while the attacker can choose to attack or to accumulate technology himself without knowing the defender type. By analogy to perfect Bayesian equilibrium for signaling games, to describe the process that attacker tries to capture useful information from the signals sent by the defender, we give a backward induction algorithm and a numerical example to disclose the equilibrium strategies when to accumulate or to attack in multiple periods by optimizing the payoffs.

Copyright

© 2015, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Xiaoyan Zhou
AU  - Jincai Huang
AU  - Guangquan Cheng
PY  - 2015/11
DA  - 2015/11
TI  - Attacker-Defender Signaling Game in Multi-Period Based on Technology Accumulation and Bayesian Learning
BT  - Proceedings of the 2015 3rd International Conference on Machinery, Materials and Information Technology Applications
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 1528
EP  - 1534
SN  - 2352-538X
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/icmmita-15.2015.282
DO  - 10.2991/icmmita-15.2015.282
ID  - Zhou2015/11
ER  -