Proceedings of the 2021 3rd International Conference on Literature, Art and Human Development (ICLAHD 2021)

Reasons-Responsive Theories and the Nature of Reasons

Authors
Qiuxuan Zheng1, *
1Xi’an Jiaotong-liverpool University, China
Corresponding Author
Qiuxuan Zheng
Available Online 29 November 2021.
DOI
10.2991/assehr.k.211120.059How to use a DOI?
Keywords
Free will; Determinism; Reasons-responsive theories; Source compatibilism
Abstract

In the contemporary free will debate between compatibilism — the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism, and incompatibilism — that free will is incompatible with determinism, many scholars are sympathetic to compatibilism, yet disagree in how the position is best characterized. As one of the most important branches of source compatibilism, reasons-responsive theories attempt to address an important issue, namely, what type of person can be regarded as moral agents. There are several controversial points within the theory. This paper aims to show that reasons-responsive theories fail as a solution to the free will debate, to the extent that they remain silent on the issue of the nature of reasons. It is this silence and inadequacy that constitute a rebuttal to reasons-responsive theories. In what follows I will propose a dilemma to reasons-responsive theories: if moral reasons are objective in the sense that one could be wrong about them, it appears that one must be a moral expert to possess the so-called “reasons-reactivity”, a necessary condition for the possession of free will. This will later be shown to be deeply implausible. If moral reasons are instead subjective in the sense that whether one has a moral reason to do X crucially depends on his mental states, then reasons-responsiveness seems to have no connection with free will at all. In addition, there are independent grounds on which the subjective account of the nature of reason can be challenged. Therefore, no matter which road reasons-responsive theorists choose to go down, there are serious objections that cast doubt on their plausibility. At the end of the paper, I will touch on the question of why reasons-responsive theories are doomed to failure due to their lack of concern with the agent’s own psychology.

Copyright
© 2021 The Authors. Published by Atlantis Press SARL.
Open Access
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license.

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Volume Title
Proceedings of the 2021 3rd International Conference on Literature, Art and Human Development (ICLAHD 2021)
Series
Advances in Social Science, Education and Humanities Research
Publication Date
29 November 2021
ISBN
978-94-6239-461-2
ISSN
2352-5398
DOI
10.2991/assehr.k.211120.059How to use a DOI?
Copyright
© 2021 The Authors. Published by Atlantis Press SARL.
Open Access
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license.

Cite this article

TY  - CONF
AU  - Qiuxuan Zheng
PY  - 2021
DA  - 2021/11/29
TI  - Reasons-Responsive Theories and the Nature of Reasons
BT  - Proceedings of the 2021 3rd International Conference on Literature, Art and Human Development (ICLAHD 2021)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 319
EP  - 324
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.211120.059
DO  - 10.2991/assehr.k.211120.059
ID  - Zheng2021
ER  -