Economic Analysis of Accident Concealment

DOI

10.2991/978-94-6463-408-2_11How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Accident concealment; corrupt; Principal-agent; Rent-seeking; Security management

Abstract

In order to deeply reveal the economic relationship between the main stakeholders of accident concealment, this paper constructed a “principal-agent” model and incorporated rent-seeking behavior into the model, and analyzed the two cases of agent corruption and rent-seeking corruption respectively. The results show that: Agent corruption can be avoided by reducing the benefits of corruption and weakening the agent’s function in the distribution of public power. The high cost of rent-seeking will increase the probability that rent-seekers will choose to conceal accidents. The cost of the inspection set by the client should not be too high. Control measures such as rectifying the law enforcement team, encouraging multi-party supervision, and raising the threshold for rent-seeking can effectively reduce the occurrence of accident concealment.

Copyright

© 2024 The Author(s)

Open Access

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Li Wang
AU  - Chenyu Ma
AU  - Chaohua Li
PY  - 2024
DA  - 2024/05/07
TI  - Economic Analysis of Accident Concealment
BT  - Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Financial Innovation and Economic Development (ICFIED 2024)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 89
EP  - 96
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-408-2_11
DO  - 10.2991/978-94-6463-408-2_11
ID  - Wang2024
ER  -