Client-Auditor Mismatches, Internal Control and Strategic Deviance

DOI

10.2991/978-94-6463-224-8_2How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Client-auditor mismatches; auditor choice; enterprise strategic deviance; internal control; corporate governance

Abstract

Uses A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2020 as research samples, this paper explores the impact of client-auditor mismatches on strategic deviance. The empirical results show that the client-auditor upward mismatches will restrain the strategic deviance to some extent, in contrast the client-auditor downward mismatches will increase the strategic deviance. The above effects are weaker for firms with higher internal control. This paper enriches the research on the economic consequences of client-auditor mismatches, expands the research perspective on the influencing factors of strategic deviance, and has essential reference value and significance for listed companies, investors, and regulatory authorities.

Copyright

© 2023 The Author(s)

Open Access

Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Libing Yang
PY  - 2023
DA  - 2023/08/23
TI  - Client-Auditor Mismatches, Internal Control and Strategic Deviance
BT  - Proceedings of the 2023 3rd International Conference on Enterprise Management and Economic Development (ICEMED 2023)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 4
EP  - 11
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-224-8_2
DO  - 10.2991/978-94-6463-224-8_2
ID  - Yang2023
ER  -