The Game Between China and the United States Based on Trade in the Epidemic Era
These authors contributed equally
- DOI
- 10.2991/aebmr.k.220603.024How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- epidemic situation; Game theory; Trade strategy; Sino-us trade
- Abstract
Since 2020, the epidemic has had a great impact on China-Us trade. On the one hand, China has been actively fighting the epidemic and is making progress in its trade with the United States. On the other hand, the United States intends to take advantage of China’s vulnerability to the epidemic by introducing trade policies and hitting China with tariffs and other means. U.S. President Joe Biden has yet to roll back Trump’s tariffs, and it remains to be seen whether the U.S. will pursue cooperation, competition, or conflict next. This paper establishes a dynamic game analysis model to study the possible strategies of the United States and China. The results show that China should not preempt its strategy at this time, and the United States is most likely to adopt a competitive strategy against China, that is, to raise tariffs on imported Chinese products. Since China is highly dependent on export trade, in order to avoid the loss caused by the MOVE of the United States, China should strengthen the development of the high-tech industry at present. At the same time, China should actively adopt a competitive strategy to get rid of the negative impact of the epidemic as soon as possible and gain an advantage in the competition between China and the United States.
- Copyright
- © 2022 The Authors. Published by Atlantis Press International B.V.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC 4.0 license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Chenyu Liang AU - Na Liu AU - Yang Liu PY - 2022 DA - 2022/07/01 TI - The Game Between China and the United States Based on Trade in the Epidemic Era BT - Proceedings of the 2022 2nd International Conference on Enterprise Management and Economic Development (ICEMED 2022) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 134 EP - 141 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.220603.024 DO - 10.2991/aebmr.k.220603.024 ID - Liang2022 ER -