Application Research Based on GSP Auction Mechanism
Authors
Qin Cao1, †, Yucheng Jiang2, †, Yingfei Zhou3, *, †
1International Academy, China Agricultural University, Beijing, China
2Changsha Hunan Guangyi Experimental Middle School, Hunan, China
3Adam Smith School of Business, University of Glasgow, Glasgow, United Kingdom
†
These authors contributed equally.
*Corresponding author. Email: yingfei.zhou@ucdenver.eduGlasgow
Corresponding Author
Yingfei Zhou
Available Online 15 December 2021.
- DOI
- 10.2991/assehr.k.211209.131How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- GSP; VCG; Experimental simulation results; Actual profitability; Real market distribution
- Abstract
In order to better choose a suitable auction method and achieve the best overall return, this paper compares and analyses Generalized-Second position (GSP) from the three aspects of experimental simulation results, actual profitability and real market distribution based on the advantages and disadvantages of the two different auction mechanisms of GSP and Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG). The two auction mechanisms of VCG are combined with real data for comparative analysis. Research shows that in actual profitability and reality, the “profitability” of GSP is better than that of VCG, and the GSP auction environment is more suitable for the current network.
- Copyright
- © 2021 The Authors. Published by Atlantis Press International B.V.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC license.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Qin Cao AU - Yucheng Jiang AU - Yingfei Zhou PY - 2021 DA - 2021/12/15 TI - Application Research Based on GSP Auction Mechanism BT - Proceedings of the 2021 3rd International Conference on Economic Management and Cultural Industry (ICEMCI 2021) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 801 EP - 807 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.211209.131 DO - 10.2991/assehr.k.211209.131 ID - Cao2021 ER -