Study on Participation Service of Cost Consulting Enterprises Based on Principal Agent Theory

DOI

10.2991/icemaess-15.2016.129How to use a DOI?

Keywords

cost consulting; participation service ;asymmetric information

Abstract

The implementation results of the construction cost consultation project are influenced by effort and customers' participation, but the inputs under the course of the service are hard to verify, which often cause a bilateral moral hazard. In view of the problem that the high quality of the cost consulting enterprise cannot have the high price called adverse selection and moral hazard leads to a lack of trust of customers, this paper designs the participation service by applying the principal-agent theory, and discusses the necessity and process of the service. Value of it is proposed to provide a new angle of view and new path of value creation for the enterprises.

Copyright

© 2016, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

Download article (PDF)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Yanran Wang
AU  - Cheng Yi
AU  - CHunLin Sun
PY  - 2015/12
DA  - 2015/12
TI  - Study on Participation Service of Cost Consulting Enterprises Based on Principal Agent Theory
BT  - Proceedings of the 2015 3rd International Conference on Education, Management, Arts, Economics and Social Science
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 587
EP  - 590
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/icemaess-15.2016.129
DO  - 10.2991/icemaess-15.2016.129
ID  - Wang2015/12
ER  -