Executive Compensation and Earnings Management -An Empirical Study of Manufacturing Industry

DOI

10.2991/icedem-17.2017.2How to use a DOI?

Keywords

Executive compensation; Management shareholding; Incentives mechanism; Earnings management

Abstract

Based on the management compensation contract and related theory of earnings management, this paper selects 480 listed A share manufacturing companies in Shanghai and Shanghai Stock Exchange from 2010 to 2014 as sample data, and takes executive monetary compensation and executive shareholding as proxy variables of executive compensation incentive mechanism. We use the absolute value of residuals estimated from modified Jones model to measure the magnitude of earnings management. This study finds a positive correlation between monetary compensation and earnings management. By contrast, the long-term equity compensation incentive has a negative link with earnings management. The combination of long-term and short-term incentive compensation has an inhibitory effect on earnings management. Moreover, this paper illustrates some suggestions for these existing problems.

Copyright

© 2017, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Chan Lyu
AU  - Chao Zhang
PY  - 2017/12
DA  - 2017/12
TI  - Executive Compensation and Earnings Management -An Empirical Study of Manufacturing Industry
BT  - Proceedings of the 2017 International Conference on Economic Development and Education Management (ICEDEM 2017)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 4
EP  - 8
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/icedem-17.2017.2
DO  - 10.2991/icedem-17.2017.2
ID  - Lyu2017/12
ER  -