Evolutionary Game Analysis of Leverage Manipulation of State-owned Enterprises
Authors
Fu Yaoqing
Corresponding Author
Fu Yaoqing
Available Online 12 July 2021.
- DOI
- 10.2991/aebmr.k.210712.009How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- Leverage Manipulation, Bounded Rationality, CPA, Evolutionary Game
- Abstract
Under the background of the steady progress of China’s “deleveraging policy”, based on the “bounded rationality” hypothesis, this paper analyzes the leverage manipulation of state-owned enterprises and the audit behavior of CPAs, and constructs a two-party evolutionary game model between state-owned enterprises and CPAs. The result shows that enterprises do not implement leverage manipulation and strict audit by CPAs are the choices to maximize the interests of both parties.
- Copyright
- © 2021, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.
- Open Access
- This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Fu Yaoqing PY - 2021 DA - 2021/07/12 TI - Evolutionary Game Analysis of Leverage Manipulation of State-owned Enterprises BT - Proceedings of the 2021 International Conference on Economic Development and Business Culture (ICEDBC 2021) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 47 EP - 51 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.210712.009 DO - 10.2991/aebmr.k.210712.009 ID - Yaoqing2021 ER -