Research on the Screening Mechanism of State-owned Enterprises Managers

DOI

10.2991/iccessh-18.2018.236How to use a DOI?

Keywords

state-owned enterprises; selection mechanism; business performance; top manager

Abstract

In research on China state-owned enterprise manager, the most important and core content is the selection mechanism of state-owned enterprise and incentive constraint mechanism. To study the incentive and restraint mechanism of top managers in China state-owned enterprises is inseparable from the selection mechanism. Through the establishment of more general screening model, polyarchy and hierarchy screening model, comparing the different structures of screening model on passing rate and average capability, providing suggestions to state-owned enterprise. This article focus on the screening structure and screening performance concluded that the polyarchy passing rate is better than hierarchy, but hierarchy managers’ average capability is higher than the polyarchy. Meanwhile, in the absence of a competitive labor market, hierarchy screening is seen as an internal labor market, more suitable for manager selection.

Copyright

© 2018, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Yuqiao Li
PY  - 2018/07
DA  - 2018/07
TI  - Research on the Screening Mechanism of State-owned Enterprises Managers
BT  - Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Contemporary Education, Social Sciences and Humanities (ICCESSH 2018)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 1046
EP  - 1050
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/iccessh-18.2018.236
DO  - 10.2991/iccessh-18.2018.236
ID  - Li2018/07
ER  -