A Design of the Incentive and Restraint Mechanisms for Venture Capitalists in the Venture Funds of the Limited Partnership

DOI

10.2991/gecss-14.2014.21How to use a DOI?

Keywords

limited partnership, venture capitalists, principal-agent relationship, incentive and restraint mechanisms

Abstract

There is a principal-agent relationship between investors and fund managers - venture capitalists for the venture funds in the limited partnership. The compensation for the venture capitalists is mainly from the fund management fees and carried interests. For the venture capital funds in the different stages, the forms and degrees of compensation mechanism are also different because of the differences of venture capitalists and their environment, as well as some other factors. The thesis focuses on the effective incentive mechanism for the fund managers with funds in the newly founded stage as well as the stage of development, so that the quality and efficiency of the fund regulation can be improved.

Copyright

© 2014, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Pingping Liu
AU  - Chunsheng Jiang
PY  - 2014/01
DA  - 2014/01
TI  - A Design of the Incentive and Restraint Mechanisms for Venture Capitalists in the Venture Funds of the Limited Partnership
BT  - Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Global Economy, Commerce and Service Science
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 82
EP  - 85
SN  - 1951-6851
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/gecss-14.2014.21
DO  - 10.2991/gecss-14.2014.21
ID  - Liu2014/01
ER  -