Dual Holding, Corporate Tax Avoidance, and Mediation Role of Corporate Governance
- DOI
- 10.2991/978-94-6463-272-9_13How to use a DOI?
- Keywords
- Dual holdings; Corporate tax avoidance; Corporate Governance
- Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between dual-holding firms and corporate tax avoidance practices. Dual holding is defined as a situation where at least one financial institution holds both debt and equity in a company simultaneously. I find that dual holding firms significantly increase corporate tax avoidance behavior. I control for the endogeneity issue by using mergers between lenders and institutional shareholders in the same firms as plausibly exogenous shocks, and my results still hold. Through cross-sectional analysis, I also find that the increase in tax avoidance behavior by dual holding companies is more significant in situations where corporate governance is weaker and where information transparency is lower. This suggests that corporate governance and information channels are the reasons why dual holding firms engage in different tax avoidance behaviors.
- Copyright
- © 2024 The Author(s)
- Open Access
- Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/), which permits any noncommercial use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
Cite this article
TY - CONF AU - Zezhong Meng PY - 2023 DA - 2023/10/15 TI - Dual Holding, Corporate Tax Avoidance, and Mediation Role of Corporate Governance BT - Proceedings of the 2023 3rd International Conference on Financial Management and Economic Transition (FMET 2023) PB - Atlantis Press SP - 116 EP - 126 SN - 2352-5428 UR - https://doi.org/10.2991/978-94-6463-272-9_13 DO - 10.2991/978-94-6463-272-9_13 ID - Meng2023 ER -