Mechanism design of Multi-attribute reverse auction on margin bid

DOI

10.2991/etmhs-18.2018.109How to use a DOI?

Keywords

multi-attribute auction; single-attribute auction; margin; procurement;

Abstract

Designing a multi-attribute auction has many advantages in respect to attributes besides price. Nevertheless, the complexity of this method makes it hard to carry out the optimal mechanism. This paper combines the first-sealed auction mechanism with multi-attribute auction, and gives a method of transforming multi-attribute auction into single-attribute auction on margin bid. The analysis indicates that this method can just not only reduce the transaction risk caused by suppliers who will abandon the bid, but also makes the multi-attribute auction more easier to implement and operate; Besides, the method meets the incentive compatibility and participation constraint conditions under which the highest bidding supplier will win the auction.

Copyright

© 2018, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Biao Liu
AU  - Benjiang Ma
AU  - Farhan Bashir Muhammad
PY  - 2018/04
DA  - 2018/04
TI  - Mechanism design of Multi-attribute reverse auction on margin bid
BT  - Proceedings of the 2018 4th International Conference on Education Technology, Management and Humanities Science (ETMHS 2018)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 515
EP  - 520
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/etmhs-18.2018.109
DO  - 10.2991/etmhs-18.2018.109
ID  - Liu2018/04
ER  -