Study on Selection of Equity Incentive Models by Chinese Private Listed Companies

DOI

10.2991/essaeme-18.2018.19How to use a DOI?

Keywords

equity incentive mechanism, stock option, restricted shares

Abstract

Principal-agent problems including information asymmetry, moral hazard and adverse selection were caused by separation between modern enterprise ownership and right of management. These problems were alleviated to a certain degree with the birth of equity incentive mechanism. Due to the short development history of equity incentive mechanism in our country, domestic scholars have different opinions on the selection, formulation, implementation and effect of equity incentive mechanism, and there was no consistent conclusion on how to select an equity incentive mechanism which is suitable for an enterprise. In this article, I compared and studied the selection preference on equity incentive mechanism of private companies in our country from the angle of company growth and financial index and put forward some suggestions on equity incentive mechanism.

Copyright

© 2018, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

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TY  - CONF
AU  - Jiamei Yu
PY  - 2018/07
DA  - 2018/07
TI  - Study on Selection of Equity Incentive Models by Chinese Private Listed Companies
BT  - Proceedings of the 2018 4th International Conference on Economics, Social Science, Arts, Education and Management Engineering (ESSAEME 2018)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 99
EP  - 104
SN  - 2352-5398
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/essaeme-18.2018.19
DO  - 10.2991/essaeme-18.2018.19
ID  - Yu2018/07
ER  -