Evolutionary Game Analysis of China’s Housing Industrialization Incentive Policy

DOI

10.2991/aebmr.k.191225.131How to use a DOI?

Keywords

housing industrialization, incentives, evolutionary game

Abstract

In order to implement the concept of sustainable development of real estate, China’s residential industrialization has integrated energy conservation, environmental protection and high efficiency on the basis of maintaining the same level of quality as before. China’s government departments have given relevant incentive policies for the development trend of residential industrialization, which will inject strong momentum into the development of residential industrialization. Based on the interaction behavior of residential industrialization stakeholders, this paper uses the relevant theory of evolutionary game theory to construct an evolutionary game model of government and real estate developers, and analyzes the transmission mechanism of incentive policies for residential industrialization in China.

Copyright

© 2020, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

Download article (PDF)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Yan Liu
AU  - Yu Luo
PY  - 2020
DA  - 2020/01/07
TI  - Evolutionary Game Analysis of China’s Housing Industrialization Incentive Policy
BT  - Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Economics, Management, Law and Education (EMLE 2019)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 718
EP  - 721
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.191225.131
DO  - 10.2991/aebmr.k.191225.131
ID  - Liu2020
ER  -