Research of Luxury Online Shopping Channel Conflict and Coordination Mechanism

DOI

10.2991/emle-18.2018.95How to use a DOI?

Keywords

luxury goods; e-commerce; channel conflict; coordination mechanisms

Abstract

The luxury online shopping attracts more and more attention of consumers, which makes the luxury brands have to pay attention to the influence of the electronic channels, but for the sensitive price system as well as the traditional agency model, triggering a series of channel conflict. In this paper, for this phenomenon, we use the theory of consumer utility to develop the model assumptions, and use the methods of linear programming, which derived the demand for products of the traditional channels and electronic channels. and then discuss the pricing strategy to maximize its profits, combined with the previous study about the introduction of consumer acceptance of the luxury online shopping, we call it θ, as well as the opportunity cost of consumer products purchased in the traditional retailers coefficient t, explore the comparison of the profit of the supply chain in the case of threshold, finally put forward the coordination mechanisms to the conflict phenomenon.

Copyright

© 2018, the Authors. Published by Atlantis Press.

Open Access

This is an open access article distributed under the CC BY-NC license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

Download article (PDF)

TY  - CONF
AU  - Shen Zhengshun
PY  - 2018/12
DA  - 2018/12
TI  - Research of Luxury Online Shopping Channel Conflict and Coordination Mechanism
BT  - Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Economics, Management, Law and Education (EMLE 2018)
PB  - Atlantis Press
SP  - 516
EP  - 522
SN  - 2352-5428
UR  - https://doi.org/10.2991/emle-18.2018.95
DO  - 10.2991/emle-18.2018.95
ID  - Zhengshun2018/12
ER  -